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Increasingly, the state and federal antitrust laws are being in-
voked in a wide variety of civil, criminal, commercial and profes-
sional disputes. While the availability of treble damages and an
award of costs and attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff' likely
provides the impetus for the assertion of civil antitrust claims,
such claims have met with little success in Virginia during 1988
and 1989. Rather, antitrust defendants have substantially pre-
vailed by asserting defenses based on, inter alia, antitrust immu-
nity; the failure to establish the required nexus with interstate
commerce; the failure to prove the existence of a conspiracy; the
failure to appropriately define the relevant market, and the failure
to demonstrate antitrust injury.
II. CIVIL ACTIONS
A. Antitrust Immunity Issues
The staggering cost of defending an antitrust claim provides a
strong incentive for a defendant to seek resolution of an action
prior to a trial on the merits. One frequently employed method is
the assertion of antitrust immunity, which has emerged as a recur-
rent theme in recent Virginia decisions.
* This article addresses legislation from the 1989 Session of the General Assembly, state
and federal antitrust enforcement efforts and decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit and state and federal courts of Virginia from January 1988 to June 1989.
The author appreciates and acknowledges the assistance of James P. Wheeler, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust and Consumer Litigation Section, Commonwealth of Virginia,
Office of Attorney General, for information regarding Virginia state antitrust enforcement
actions.
** Partner, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, Roanoke, Virginia; A.B., 1978, College of Wil-
liam and Mary; J.D., 1981, University of Virginia School of Law. The author is a member of
the Board of Governors of the Antitrust Section of the Virginia State Bar. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the assistance of his colleagues, Elizabeth A. Schell and Francis H.
Casola, as well as that of David A. Clark, Washington and Lee School of Law, Class of 1991,
in the creation of this article.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.12(b) (Repl. Vol. 1987); 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
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1. Parker v. Brown State Action Immunity
The doctrine of state action immunity was first enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown,2 where the Court held that
the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit states from impos-
ing restraints on competition. "Although Parker involved an action
against a state official, the [c]ourt's reasoning extends to suits
against private parties. '
The circumstances under which the state action doctrine immu-
nizes private conduct were refined in California Retail Liquor
Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.4 The Court's opin-
ion in Midcal establishes a two-pronged test for determining
whether state regulation of private parties invokes state action im-
munity. "First, the challenged restraint must be one clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed as state policy."' 5 Second, the
state must actively supervise any private anticompetitive conduct.'
Federal courts sitting in Virginia and Virginia state courts have
considered the state action doctrine five times in 1988 and 1989.1
In each case, the courts grappled with the scope of Parker v.
Brown immunity. While each case is necessarily limited to its facts,
2. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). In Parker, the Supreme Court exempted from the antitrust
laws the conduct of California in regulating the marketing of raisins.
3. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56 (1985).
4. 445 U.S. 97 (1980); see also Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Clair, 471 U.S. 34 (1985). The
Court in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. took the Midcal analysis one step
further and addressed whether state compulsion is required to immunize the actions of pri-
vate parties. Discounting reliance on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), for
the establishment of a compulsion requirement, the Court held that state compulsion is not
a prerequisite to a finding of state action immunity:
A private party acting pursuant to an anti-competitive regulatory program need
not "point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" for its challenged conduct.
As long as the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace competition in a particu-
lar field with a regulatory structure, the first prong of the Midcal test is satisfied.
(citation omitted).
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 471 U.S. at 61.
The Hallie Court applied the "clearly articulated state policy" test to municipalities but
held that active state supervision is not required to immunize their conduct from the anti-
trust laws. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
5. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
6. Id.
7. Pendleton Constr. Corp. v. Rockbridge County, Va., 837 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1988); Hill-
man Flying Serv., Inc. v. City of Roanoke, 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,069 (4th Cir. 1988);
Mahendra Shah v. Memorial Hosp., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,199 (W.D. Va. 1988);
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Commonwealth Gas Serv., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Va. 1988);
Avins v. Virginia Council, 11 Va. Cir. 191 (1988).
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it is interesting to note that while governmental entities were con-
sistently found to possess Parker v. Brown immunity, efforts by
private entities to extend the reach of the state action doctrine to
encompass their activities were less successful.
In the only Virginia state court case, Avins v. Virginia Council,8
the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria held that the regula-
tion of education is state action exempt from the antitrust laws. In
Avins, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the Virginia Council
of Education and the Attorney General of Virginia because of cer-
tain Council actions regarding the Northern Virginia Law School.
Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the actions of the Council
in refusing to transfer course credits constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Sustaining a
demurrer to the antitrust claim, the court reasoned that:
[N]othing could more clearly be state action than the education of a
state's citizen. Even without the clearly enunciated state policy as
set forth in the Code of Virginia, §§ 23-265 et seq., there could be no
doubt that education, even higher education, and its regulation, is a
matter of direct state action by the legislatureY
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit enunciated an ex-
pansive application of the state action doctrine in Hillman Flying
Service, Inc. v. City of Roanoke.1" In Hillman, the court deter-
mined that the doctrine immunized not only the conduct of the
City of Roanoke in regulating airport services, but also that of the
City's alleged co-conspirator, Piedmont Aviation. In Hillman, an
air carrier service firm filed suit against the City of Roanoke and
Piedmont Aviation, Inc., alleging an antitrust conspiracy to restrict
competition at the Roanoke Regional Airport designed to prevent
service firms, other than defendant Piedmont Aviation, from pro-
viding aviation fuel service. The City of Roanoke denied Hillman's
application to become an aviation fuel vendor because its opera-
tions did not meet minimum space requirements imposed by city
ordinance.'
As to the City of Roanoke, the Fourth Circuit recognized that
the Code of Virginia vests regulatory authority over airports in
8. 11 Va. Cir. 191 (1988).
9. Id. at 193.
10. 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,069 (4th Cir. 1988).
11. Id. at 58,479.
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municipalities. As a result, "Roanoke's implementation of fuel ser-
vice space requirements and its decisions regarding leasing of
space" 12 followed a "clearly articulated state policy" and, accord-
ingly, were protected by state action immunity.' 3
The court in Hillman applied this doctrine to also immunize also
Piedmont Aviation, reasoning that:
Piedmont also cannot be held liable for entering into contracts and
providing services in accordance with the Roanoke Code, even if it
obtained monopoly power by doing so. State action immunity ex-
tends to private parties when the clearly articulated state policy is
also accompanied by active state supervision. Since the ordinance
was pursuant to state policy, Piedmont's contracting and perform-
ance under that ordinance, as enforced by the City and airport offi-
cials, should also be protected. In short, a private company should
not be liable for lobbying lawfully and fully complying with the re-
sulting law.' 4
In a similar decision, terming the district court's opinion" "un-
assailable," the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Pendle-
ton Construction Corp. v. Rockbridge County, Virginia,", affirmed
the district court's grant of state action immunity to allegations by
Pendleton, a road contractor, that the Rockbridge County Board of
Supervisors and Rockbridge County conspired with a competing
contractor and quarry operator to deny plaintiff permits to mine
stone for a road repair project. 7 The district court carefully fol-
lowed an analogous opinion from Maryland,' 8 and held Virginia's
statutory zoning scheme to constitute a clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed state policy immunizing the County and its
Board of Supervisors from antitrust liability.1 9
In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Commonwealth Gas Services, Inc.,2 °
defendants asserted that the actions of the defendant natural gas
12. Id. at 58,479-80.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citation omitted).
15. Pendleton Constr. Corp. v. Rockbridge County, Virginia, 652 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va.
1987).
16. 837 F.2d 178, 179 (4th Cir. 1988).
17. Id.
18. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 601 F. Supp. 892 (D. Md. 1985),
aff'd, 786 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1986).
19. Pendleton, 652 F. Supp. at 318-20.
20. 682 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Va. 1988).
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transportation companies were exempt from the antitrust laws
under the state action doctrine and the doctrine of primary juris-
diction.21 Reynolds, a natural gas consumer, contended that de-
fendants unlawfully refused to transport natural gas from indepen-
dent producers and exploited their exclusive control over gas
transportation to Richmond to force Reynolds and other consum-
ers to purchase defendants' gas.22
Defendants filed tariffs and were regulated by the Virginia State
Corporation Commission ("SCC"). Not surprisingly, these defend-
ants argued that the state action doctrine barred Reynolds from
challenging state regulated transportation policies. Specifically, de-
fendants contended that a reference in a September 1986 SCC or-
der to "voluntary" participation in transportation programs evi-
denced a state policy permitting public utilities to refuse to
provide transportation services.23 Defendants also argued that the
SCC's awareness of their transportation policies and lack of action
regarding them indicated the SCC's tacit approval.24 The district
court rejected these arguments, finding that the 1986 SCC order
and other SCC actions indicated a state policy favoring open ac-
cess to natural gas transportation services.
25
In the hospital peer review context, a federal district court in
Virginia denied state action immunity, ruling that Virginia did not
actively supervise the peer review process at a private hospital.26 In
Mahendra Shah, Judge Kiser applied the Supreme Court's opinion
in Patrick v. Burget.27 In Patrick, the Supreme Court held that
21. Id. at 293. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction recognizes the regulatory expertise of
administrative agencies and suspends the judicial process "pending referral of such issues to
the administrative body for its views." United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-
64 (1956).
In Reynolds Metals, defendants sought to apply this doctrine, arguing that the SCC and
FERC should adjudicate issues regarding natural gas transportation. Reynolds contended
that a stay was not appropriate because there were no existing or potential administrative
proceedings that could resolve any issues relating to Reynolds' antitrust claims and further
that then allegations involved violations of the antitrust laws rather than a tariff dispute.
The district court agreed, reasoning that the SCC and the FERC were not designed to ad-
dress the relief sought and that FERC lacked jurisdiction over retrospective claims. Reyn-
olds Metals, 682 F. Supp. at 294-95.
22. Reynolds Metals, 682 F. Supp. at 292-93.
23. Id. at 294.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Mahendra Shah v. Memorial Hosp., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 68,199 (W.D. Va.
1988).
27. Id. at 59,325 (citing Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988)).
19891
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Oregon's regulation of physicians and hospitals did not constitute
active supervision of the physician peer review process sufficient
under Midcal to immunize the conduct of physicians and a private
hospital arising out of the exclusion of a physician from the hospi-
tal's medical staff.2 Defendants in Mahendra Shah sought to dis-
tinguish Patrick, contending that the Virginia statutory and regu-
latory scheme, unlike that of Oregon, provides for reporting of staff
privileging decisions to state agencies and authorizes aggrieved
physicians to seek injunctive relief in state court.29 Despite signifi-
cant statutory and administrative differences, the district court re-
jected this contention, ruling that state agencies have no involve-
ment in or authority over peer review decisions and that injunctive
relief was "not a review of the merits of the privilege determina-
tion required for state action immunity."30
2. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984
The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 ("LGAA")3 ' was
enacted to clarify antitrust immunity of local governments.3 2 Two
28. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1663-66 (1988).
29. Shah, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 59,325.
30. Id. Following Patrick, the Eleventh Circuit in Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center,
851 F.2d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir.), vacated, 861 F.2d 1233 (11th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other
grounds, 874 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1989), concluded that Florida's regulatory scheme, which
provided for "probing judicial review of medical staff privilege peer review decisions," con-
stituted sufficient active supervision to warrant state action immunity. On rehearing en
banc, however, appellee hospitals and medical staffs waived state action immunity. 874 F.2d
at 756.
In addition, Justice Whiting's opinion in Medical Center Hosps. v. Terzis, 235 Va. 443,
367 S.E.2d 728 (1986), arguably constrains the application of the state action doctrine in
Virginia. In Terzis, the court limited judicial review of privileging decisions pursuant to VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-134.1 (Repl. Vol. 1985), to a consideration of whether the reasons given for
staff privilege decisions are within the statutory criteria. Terzis, 235 Va. at 446, 367 S.E.2d
at 730. The Patrick limitation on state action immunity for health care providers involved
in peer review may be less critical in light of the immunity provisions of the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. 1987).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. 1984).
32. The legislative history of the LGAA noted concern over an "increasing number of
antitrust suits, and threatened suits, that could undermine a local government's ability to
govern in the public interest." H.R. Rep. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4602, 4603. 15 U.S.C. § 35(a) provides that "[n]o damages,
interest on damages, costs or attorney's fees may be recovered under Section 4, 4A or 4C of
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a or 15c) from any local government, or official or em-
ployee thereof acting in an official capacity." This statute was apparently a reaction to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S.
40 (1982).
In Boulder, the Court refused to exempt a Colorado city's actions regarding its regulation
of cable television. The Court was unpersuaded by the city's argument that the Colorado
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decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have ap-
plied this recently enacted immunity statute and affirmed district
court dismissals of antitrust challenges involving, respectively, a
Virginia airport and a North Carolina hospital. As was true of its
application of state action immunity, the Fourth Circuit in Hill-
man had little trouble immunizing certain defendants' conduct
under the LGAA. The district court dismissed the conspiracy alle-
gations against the city, members of the Roanoke City Council,
Roanoke Airport Advisory Commission and the manager of the
Roanoke Regional Airport, reasoning that:
In light of Congress' desire to grant broad immunity from noncrimi-
nal acts by local officials and the broad authority that Virginia
grants to municipalities to operate local airports, Hillman has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Clayton
Act for damages against the municipal defendants. 33
Without elaboration, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that LGAA immunity immunized the City from any claim for
damages asserted by Hillman.3 4
Sandcrest Outpatient Services v. Cumberland County Hospital
System, Inc.,35 involved the extension of LGAA immunity to non-
governmental entities. From 1981 to 1986, Sandcrest Outpatient
Services ("Sandcrest") provided physician services to a hospital
emergency room. When the emergency room contract was awarded
to a competitor in 1986, Sandcrest filed suit, alleging a conspiracy
to restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act 3 6 and
Constitution delegated regulation of cable television to municipalities by means of its "home
rule" amendment, reasoning:
The Parker state-action exemption reflects Congress' intention to embody in the
Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a significant measure of
sovereignty under our Constitution. But this principle contains its own limitation:
Ours is a "dual system of government," Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added),
which has no place for sovereign cities.
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53.
Because Colorado had taken no position on the regulation of cable television, the Court
held that the city's conduct did not meet the Parker, "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy" test as refined by California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Mid-
cal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
33. Hillman Flying Serv., Inc. v. City of Roanoke, 652 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (W.D. Va.
1987).
34. 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,069, at 58,479 (4th Cir. 1988).
35. 853 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1988).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
in conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
1989]
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state law."7
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment and held that the conduct of
the defendants was immune from antitrust challenge under the
LGAA.35 Sandcrest did not challenge the district court's determi-
nation that the hospital system was a local governmental unit for
purposes of the LGAA. Rather, on appeal, Sandcrest challenged
the district court's application of LGAA immunity to the contract
managers of the hospital, the hospital administrator and chief of
staff. The Fourth Circuit held that these parties, even though non-
governmental, were entitled to immunity because the challenged
conduct was clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy and actively supervised by the state.3 9
In so doing, the Fourth Circuit held that "an affirmative grant of
explicit authority is not required for an employee or government
official to be acting in an official capacity under the LGAA,"40 and
rejected the argument that the immunity contained in the LGAA
was unavailable in the context of an unauthorized conspiracy, rea-
soning that "[i]f this view was accepted, the fundamental purpose
of the LGAA's immunity provisions would be substantially under-
cut."'" Noting that hospitals may lawfully make the kind of man-
agement decisions involved in this case, the
argument that allegations of a conspiracy convert otherwise author-
ized conduct into unauthorized conduct would require consideration
of whether the subjective motives or intentions of the appellees were
to benefit themselves rather than the hospital. The LGAA makes no
provision for consideration of a defendant's motives, and an allega-
tion that an act was done pursuant to a conspiracy is akin to an
allegation that it was done in bad faith or with malice.42
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."
37. Sandcrest, 853 F.2d at 1141.
38. Id. at 1144.
39. Id. at 1143; see also California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). The Fourth Circuit relied on the legislative history of the LGAA
which stated that the extension of that immunity to nongovernmental entities "shall apply
by analogy to the conduct of a local government in diverting the actions of nongovernmental
parties, as if the local government were a state." Sandcrest, 853 F.2d at 1143 (citing H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 1158, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4602, 4602).
40. Sandcrest, 853 F.2d at 1145; see Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d
91, 94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986).





The Noerr-Pennington doctrine exempts efforts to petition the
government from antitrust liability.43 Under this doctrine, joint
lobbying and other efforts to "influence public officials do not vio-
late the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competi-
tion. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of
a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act."' 44 Noerr-
Pennington immunity has been expanded beyond efforts to influ-
ence legislation to include activity directed at courts and adminis-
trative agencies.4 5 In three recent cases, the federal courts in Vir-
ginia had little difficulty applying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
to immunize alleged concerted action.
In Hillman Flying Service, Inc. v. City of Roanoke,46 the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Piedmont Aviation's
efforts to convince City of Roanoke officials "to pass, retain or en-
force the city ordinances are protected under the so-called Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, even if made with the sole purpose of elimi-
nating competition. ' 47 The court similarly rejected Hillman's ef-
forts to invoke the sham exception.4 s
43. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presi-
dents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
44. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
45. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
46. 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 68,069 (4th Cir. 1988).
47. Id. at 58,479.
48. Id. In Noerr, the Court noted that "[t]here may be situations in which a publicity
campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to
cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified."
365 U.S. at 144.
In California Motor Transport, the Court noted:
There are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may cor-
rupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust viola-
tions. Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when
used in the adjudicatory process. Opponents before agencies or courts often think
poorly of the other's tactics, motions, or defenses and may readily call them baseless.
One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go unnoticed; but a
pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the fact-finder to con-
clude that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused. That may be a
difficult line to discern and draw. However, once it is drawn, the case is established
that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result, viz., effectively barring re-
spondents from access to the agencies and courts. Insofar as the administrative or
judicial processes are involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seek-
ing refuge under the umbrella of 'political expression.'
404 U.S. at 513.
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Moreover, in Pendleton Construction Corp. v. Rockbridge
County, Virginia,49 the district court held that the actions of a
contractor in attempting to influence the Rockbridge County
Board of Supervisors fell within the parameters of Noerr-Pen-
nington. The court also rejected the plaintiff's attempt to invoke
the sham exception, noting that the actions of the defendant "had
neither the purpose nor effect of barring plaintiff's access to gov-
ernmental process. '50 Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate any
abuse of process; in fact, defendant's success before both the Board
of Supervisors and the Circuit Court of Rockbridge County "belies
any sham use of the governmental process."'"
Similarly, in Dixie-Narco, Inc. v. Steeley, 52 the Fourth Circuit
immunized litigation efforts under Noerr-Pennington and rejected
plaintiff's suggestions of sham behavior.5 3 Dixie-Narco, a soft drink
vending machine company, sued a former employee's competing
business for breach of fiduciary obligations. The former employee,
Steeley, counterclaimed, alleging interference with his business ac-
tivities in violation of the Sherman Act. The Fourth Circuit dis-
agreed as follows:
Despite Steeley's protestations to the contrary, his antitrust and
business interference allegations focused almost exclusively on inter-
ference by Dixie-Narco's litigation efforts. The district court prop-
erly ruled that Dixie-Narco had a protected right to pursue judi-
cially its claims against Steeley. . . . The district court held, and we
agree, that the corporation's litigation efforts did not fall within the
"sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 4
Thus, while the sham exception was asserted in each of these
cases, the federal courts in Virginia made short shrift of these con-
tentions, immunizing competitive efforts in the legislative and ju-
dicial arenas. 5
49. 652 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1987).
50. Id. at 320 (quoting Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 601 F. Supp.
892 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd, 786 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1986)).
51. Pendleton, 652 F. Supp. at 320.
52. 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,380 (4th Cir. 1988).
53. Id. at 60,097.
54. Id. Considering the rationale employed by the district court in Pendleton, it is inter-
esting to note that the district court in Dixie-Narco rejected the sham exception despite the
fact that both it and the jury found Dixie-Narco's claims to be baseless.
55. So as not to be discouraged, however, practitioners representing antitrust plaintiffs




-In two hospital staff privilege cases, the Western District of Vir-
ginia has split over whether plaintiff physicians demonstrated a
nexus with interstate commerce sufficient to state a Sherman Act
claim.
In Mahendra Shah v. Memorial Hospital,6 plaintiff urologist al-
leged that competing physicians and hospital employees conspired
to destroy his Danville, Virginia medical practice. Plaintiff alleged
the involvement of interstate commerce because some patients
travelled from North Carolina to Virginia for treatment, payments
for urological services were made by out of state payees, medical
equipment was purchased from out of state suppliers, and plaintiff
attended some out of state medical seminars.
Recognizing that Danville is "about four miles from the North
Carolina border" and that "at least 10% of the hospital's patients
are from outside Virginia," Judge Kiser ruled that a question of
fact existed as to whether the requisite nexus with interstate com-
merce existed.5 7 The court declined to decide whether the appro-
priate jurisdictional test required a showing that the alleged re-
straint affected interstate commerce or merely that the defendant's
general business activities affected interstate commerce.58
Regardless of which test applies, Shah has alleged facts establishing
the nexus with interstate commerce. Plaintiff has alleged that TMH
DUC and the individual physicians treat patients traveling in inter-
state commerce, thus meeting the broader standard. He has also al-
leged a restraint which drove him out of the practice of urology and
prevents other urologists from practicing in the area. The alleged
restraints would necessarily affect the number of urologists practic-
ing in Danville and the competitive pricing of their services. These
restraints would inevitably have an effect on patients desiring uro-
logic services, in Danville, including those traveling interstate, from
North Carolina or elsewhere.59
Despite the court's assumption regarding Shah's ability at trial
verdict for the plaintiff in a sham exception case. ETSI v. Burlington Northern, Inc., No. B-
84-979 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 1989).
56. 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,199 (W.D. Va. 1988).
57. Id. at 59,326.
58. Id.; see McLain v. Real Estate Bd. Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
59. Shah, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 59,326.
1989]
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to establish the requisite jurisdictional nexus, Shah presented little
evidence at the summary judgment stage to establish that the re-
moval of one physician could substantially and adversely affect in-
terstate commerce. While the court recognized that ten percent of
the hospital's patients were not Virginia residents, Shah presented
no evidence that the alleged conspiracy would affect the interstate
flow of patients, supplies or reimbursement. While certainly a split
in authority exists, prior precedent within the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit and the majority of the decided cases raise a
question as to Shah's jurisdictional proof."
In Thompson v. Wise General Hospital,6' Judge Williams
adopted the more limited jurisdictional test espoused by the ma-
jority of the circuits.6 2 "Accordingly, although the plaintiff can
base antitrust jurisdiction on the broad range of the defendants'
activities rather than just those activities that he especially chal-
lenges, the alleged effect on interstate commerce still must be more
than merely derisory. '63 Based on this test, Judge Williams found
plaintiff's conclusory jurisdictional allegations insufficient.
There is nothing in the complaint to indicate that there are so few
doctors in Wise County, Virginia, that the gain or loss of one of
them would have a noticeable effect on the amount of competition.
Nor is there any particular showing of how the plaintiff's loss of pa-
tients would affect interstate commerce. There is no allegation that
a significant number of Dr. Thompson's patients came to him from
outside of Virginia. And although some courts have held that an ef-
60. See, e.g., Sarin v. Samaritan Health Center, 813 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1987); Doe v. St.
Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986); Stone v. William Beaumont Hosp., 782 F.2d
609, 613-14 (6th Cir. 1986); Seglin v. Esau, 769 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1985); Hayden v. Bracy,
744 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (8th Cir. 1984); Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922
(2d Cir. 1983); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980);
Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980); Harron v. United Hosp. Center,
Inc., 522 F.2d 1133, 1134 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976); Anesthesia Ad-
vantage v. Metz Group, 708 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Colo. 1989); Litman v. A. Barton Hepburn
Hosp., 679 F. Supp. 196 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); Rosenberg v. Healthcorp Affiliates, 663 F. Supp.
222 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Mamakos v. Huntington Hosp., 653 F. Supp. 1447 (E.D.N.Y. 1987);
Kling v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 626 F. Supp. 1285 (C.D. Ill. 1986); Capili v. Shott,
487 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. W. Va. 1978), aff'd, 620 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1980).
61. 707 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. Va. 1989).
62. See Seglin v. Esau, 769 F.2d 1274, 1280 (7th Cir. 1985); Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d
1338, 1342-43 (8th Cir. 1984); Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922, 926 (2d
Cir. 1983); Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 649 F.2d 36, 45
(1st Cir. 1981); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715, 722-24 (10th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
63. Thompson, 707 F. Supp. at 855.
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fect on interstate commerce can be found in a denial of privileges
case from the loss of Medicare and Medicaid payments (or medical
insurance payments), and purchase of out of state medical supplies,
• ..any effect in this case - even if it had been alleged, which it
was not - would be de minimis in light of the fact that Dr. Thomp-
son relocated his practice within Virginia."'
The Shah and Thompson decisions are difficult to reconcile.
Perhaps the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit will clarify
the operative test and evidentiary standard in the Thompson case,
which is currently on appeal.
C. Market Definition Issues
A significant element of plaintiff's proof in any Sherman Act
claim is the relevant market allegedly restrained or monopolized. 5
In Mahendra Shah v. Memorial Hospital,6 the district court re-
jected defendant's summary judgment argument that plaintiff in-
sufficiently defined the relevant market. The court held that mar-
ket definition "is an issue of fact to be determined by the jury.'M 7
On the other hand, the district court in Steuer & Latham, P.A.
v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc.,6" was not so reticent. In
that case, two pathologists brought an antitrust suit after their pa-
thology services contracts with defendant hospital were cancelled
in favor of another physician. Alleging violations of sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs asserted that the relevant geo-
graphic market was a single hospital's service area. The district
court rejected this geographic market, noting that "[t]he case law
likewise makes clear that plaintiffs' claim that the relevant anti-
trust market consists of a single hospital is patently absurd. '6e The
court further reasoned that plaintiff offered no evidence of elastic-
ity of demand and barriers to entry. "Absent such evidence, which
plaintiffs have the burden of introducing, there is no basis for in-
ferring that a service area constitutes a geographic market, or that
64. Id.
65. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy
Co., 805 F.2d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1986); Satellite Television v. Continental Cablevision, 714
F.2d 351, 357 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984).
66. 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,199 (W.D. Va. 1988).
67. Id. at 59,329.
68. 672 F. Supp. 1489 (D.S.C. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
69. Id. at 1514.
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the patient origin data pertinent to that service area constitute
'market share' information." 70 Not satisfied with its finding that
the plaintiff had failed to adduce appropriate evidence as to geo-
graphic market, the court crafted its own geographic market larger
than that advocated by the plaintiff, largely employing hospital ad-
mission and payment statistics. Having appropriately defined the
geographic market, the court held that:
CMH's low shares in these markets, along with its steadily declining
occupancy rates, . ., and the excess capacity at competing hospitals
demonstrate that CMH has no market power and thus has neither
the incentive nor the ability to reduce competition in any properly
defined market for hospital services. Any attempt by CMH to en-
gage in anticompetitive conduct would only cause additional pa-
tients to be lost to competing hospitals."1
Once again, the decisions in Mahendra Shah and Steuer &
Latham, P.A., are seemingly inconsistent with the South Carolina
district court holding plaintiff to a stricter evidentiary burden at
the summary judgment stage.
The district court in United States v. Carilion Health System, 2
reached similar conclusions regarding hospital markets to the
Steuer & Latham, P.A. court in the context of an Antitrust Divi-
sion challenge to an affiliation of two Roanoke not-for-profit hospi-
tals. Critical to the court's ultimate conclusion that no unreasona-
ble restraint of trade would result from the proposed affiliation was
its determination that the relevant product and geographic mar-
kets were substantially broader than those advocated by the Anti-
trust Division. While the Antitrust Division contended that the
relevant market was acute inpatient hospital services in the Roa-
noke Valley, the judge and the advisory jury both found that the
relevant product market included acute inpatient hospital services
and certain outpatient health care services provided by various
types of outpatient facilities."3
The court also rejected the jury's finding and the Antitrust Divi-
sion's contention that the geographic market was limited to the
Roanoke Valley. Instead, it defined the market as all counties and
70. Id. at 1511.
71. Id. at 1514-15.
72. 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989).
73. Id. at 847.
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independent cities from which Roanoke Memorial Hospital (one of
those affected by the affiliation) drew at least 100 patients a year.
In stark contrast to the narrow geographic market advocated by
the Antitrust Division (containing only three acute care hospitals),
the court's geographic market contained approximately twenty
other hospitals. The court added that the geographic market for
tertiary (highly specialized) care extended even further and in-
cluded major teaching medical centers in Charlottesville and Rich-
mond, Virginia, and Winston-Salem and Durham, North
Carolina.74
The court's market definition rulings recognizes the significant
role played by outpatient services in today's health care market
and the reality that Roanoke is a regional medical center. These
factors contributed significantly to the court's finding that the pro-
posed affiliation did not present an unreasonable restraint of
trade.75
D. Sherman Act Section 1 Conspiracy Issues
In a variety of contexts, the federal courts in Virginia have
shouldered the burden imposed upon them by the 1986 Supreme
Court trilogy of summary judgment cases 6 and have largely re-
fused to allow antitrust conspiracy allegations to survive summary
judgment.77 Dismissal typically results from plaintiffs' inability to
prove conspiracy or establish antitrust injury.
1. Cases Involving the Manufacturer/Dealer Relationship
Antitrust actions filed by terminated dealers face little prospect
of success following the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Mon-
santo v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,78 Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co. v. Zenith Radio,79 and Business Electronics Corp. v.
74. Id. at 847-48.
75. Juxtaposed with the Carillon opinion is the Illinois federal court decision halting the
merger of two Rockford, Illinois hospitals. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 1989-
1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,462 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Resolution of the two divergent approaches to
nonprofit hospital affiliations lies with the appellate courts.
76. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
77. It is significant to note at the outset that the courts did not apply the per se rule to
any of these Sherman Act conspiracy cases.
78. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
79. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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Sharp Electronics Corp.,80 and the Fourth Circuit's opinions in
Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Industries,$' National
Marine Electronic Distributors, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.,82 and Gar-
ment District, Inc. v. Belk Stores Services, Inc.8
Following these cases, in order to survive summary judgment on
a Sherman Act section 1 claim, a terminated dealer must meet a
rigid standard, mustering evidence "that tends to exclude the pos-
sibility of independent action" and "that reasonably tends to prove
a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to
achieve an unlawful objective. '8 4 In applying this standard to the
antitrust claims of a terminated distributor, the Supreme Court
held that a conspiracy cannot be inferred merely from the com-
plaints of other distributors to the manufacturer, and the subse-
80. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
81. 763 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff, a carpet retailer, brought suit against
Eatman's, a competitor, and Lees, its supplier, alleging a conspiracy in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act, stemming from Lees' termination of Terry's as a distributor.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed Monsanto holding that a conspiracy
is not established by proof that a manufacturer terminated a distributor following, or even
in response to, complaints by other dealers. Id. at 611.
82. 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1985). In Raytheon, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that there was sufficient evidence to prove that other dealers made complaints to
Raytheon about plaintiff dealer, National, and that they even threatened to cease doing
business with Raytheon if the relationship with National was not terminated. The court
further found that Raytheon's decision to terminate National as a dealer was made in the
context of these complaints and that the complaints played a part in the decision. Neverthe-
less, the court held that this was insufficient to prove a conspiracy to restrain retail price
competition:
Permitting an agreement to be inferred merely from the existence of complaints, or
even from the fact that termination came about 'in response to' complaints, could
deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct. . . .To bar a manufacturer from act-
ing solely because the information upon which it acts originated as a price complaint
would create an irrational dislocation in the market.
Id. at 193 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)); see also
White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 102 (4th Cir. 1987).
83. 799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986). In Garment District, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, relying on Monsanto and Raytheon, held that a large distributor may apply
certain pressure to its manufacturer to terminate its relationship with another distributor
without violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. Garment District, a discount distributor,
claimed that Belk, a large competitor, operating 200 stores, had coerced the manufacturer
into terminating Garment District's distributorship by threatening to discontinue the manu-
facturer's line of clothing. The court rejected Garment District's claims stating that, without
more, a manufacturer's termination of a discounting distributor in response to Belk's com-
plaint is insufficient to prove an illegal price-fixing conspiracy. Id. at 911.
84. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768. To date, efforts in Congress to repeal this evidentiary
standard and allow dealer termination cases to pass the summary judgment stage by merely
proving the existence of competing dealer complaints have failed. See, e.g., Freedom From
Vertical Price Fixing Act of 1987, H.R. Rep. No. 421, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).
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quent termination of the distributor:
To permit the inference of concerted action on the basis of receiving
complaints alone and thus to expose the defendant to treble damage
liability would both inhibit management's exercise of its indepen-
dent business judgment and emasculate the terms of the statute."5
In Hubs & Wheels, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., s6 plain-
tiffs alleged that Goodyear conspired with a large regional dealer,
Appalachian Tire Products ("ATP"), to terminate Hubs & Wheels'
dealer contract with Goodyear. a" Considering as true plaintiff's evi-
dence that Goodyear terminated the dealer contract at ATP's re-
quest, the court found the evidence insufficient to establish a con-
spiracy violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court noted
that plaintiff's evidence, at most, established a termination by
Goodyear in response to ATP's complaint. Citing Matsushita for
the proposition that conduct that is as consistent with permissible
competition as with conspiracy does not, standing alone, support
an inference of antitrust conspiracy, Judge Williams rejected the
antitrust conspiracy claim. 8
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co.,89 was an appeal
of the dismissal of Heileman's suit challenging Stroh's termination
of its regional distribution agreement. While the opinion largely fo-
cused on the applicability of Maryland's Beer Franchise Act,90 and
the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for consideration consistent
therewith, the court noted in a footnote that:
We reserve judgment at this time on the antitrust implications of
the notice requirement. However, based on the Maryland court's
emphasis on the manufacturer-distributor relationship of Stroh and
Heileman, our initial impression is that the notice provision is not a
85. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
637 F.2d 105, 111 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
86. No. 86-0071-A (W.D. Va. Nov. 28, 1988).
87. Plaintiff Dotson, the owner of Hubs & Wheels, Inc. asserted in that capacity, antitrust
allegations in the amended complaint. Judge Williams, following Associated General Con-
tractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535-46 (1983), dismissed Dotson's antitrust claims, rul-
ing that he lacked standing to assert them. Hubs & Wheels, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., No. 86-0071-A (W.D. Va. Sept. 1, 1988).
88. Id. at 14.
89. 843 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1988).
90. Maryland's Beer Franchise Fair Dealing Act, MD. ALCO. BEN. CODE ANN. Art. 2B, §§
203A-203G (Repl. Vol. 1987).
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Sherman Act violation on its face.9
While not specifically a dealer termination case, C-Z Farm, Inc.
v. American Horse Shows Association,92 contains some elements
common to those cases. Plaintiff C-Z Farm sued defendant Ameri-
can Horse Shows Association ("AHSA") claiming that AHSA
breached its membership contract with C-Z Farm and violated fed-
eral antitrust laws by refusing to sanction a C-Z horse show. C-Z
alleged a conspiracy between AHSA and the Virginia State Horse
Show arising out of AHSA's decision to recognize the Virginia
State Horse Show rather than the C-Z horse show. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's dis-
missal of the antitrust allegations, reasoning:
C-Z Farm did not properly allege an agreement in restraint of trade,
and its monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
did not state a proper claim for a refusal to deal with respect to an
essential facility. Absent an antitrust challenge to the AHSA's 250-
mile rule or AHSA's protection of a previously recognized horse
show, the gravamen of C-Z Farm's Sherman Act claims is not that
an impairment of the process of competition gave rise to the anti-
trust injury, but simply that it did not prevail in its competition
with the Virginia State Horse Show for recognized status.93
2. Cases in the Health Care Context
Despite repeated rejection by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit,94 cases involving hospital staff privileges and exclu-
sive contracts continue to proliferate in the district courts. In the
hospital staff privileges context, three of the four suits considered
in 1988 did not survive motions for summary judgment.
91. 843 F.2d at 172 n.2. It is difficult to discern from the Fourth Circuit's opinion its
rationale for an oblique reference to antitrust law in a case seemingly devoid of antitrust
allegations. Moreover, if the notice requirement to which the court refers is mandated by
Maryland state law and enforced by its courts, it appears that Parker v. Brown state action
immunity would apply.
92. No. 87-3628 (4th Cir. Apr. 13, 1988).
93. Id. at 5.
94. See, e.g., White v. Rockingham Radiologists, 820 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1987); Cooper v.
Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc., 789 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986);
Harron v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 522 F.2d 1133, 1134 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424




In the only antitrust action to survive summary judgment, Judge
Kiser in Mahendra Shah v. Memorial Hospital9 5 was faced with
seemingly conflicting claims of conspiracy, motivated alternatively
by anticompetitive aims or racial and national origin discrimina-
tion. Judge Kiser resolved the conflict by granting summary judg-
ment as to the plaintiff's civil rights claims and denying the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's
antitrust claim.
The district court rejected the plaintiff's civil rights allegations
due to insufficient proof of racial motivation yet denied the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment as to- antitrust conspiracy,
ruling that a question of fact existed. The court recognized that
plausible procompetitive reasons existed for the alleged delays in
granting staff privileges and refusal to cover for plaintiff's prac-
tice. 6 Nevertheless, the court noted that an inference of anticom-
petitive behavior could also be drawn. Central to an understanding
of Judge Kiser's opinion is his distinction of White v. Rockingham
Radiologists, Ltd., and Cooper v. Forsyth County Hospital Au-
thority, Inc., prior Fourth Circuit precedent rejecting antitrust
staff privileges claims. Judge Kiser held:
By contrast, there is no single entity to whom we can assign respon-
sibility for the actions aggrieving Shah, and there is no single, clear
rationale underlying them .... The implication of a conscious
commitment to a common scheme is dramatically greater where de-
fendants are alleged to have taken general independent actions
whose effect is to drive plaintiff from the marketplace.9 7
The court also rejected the defendants' contention that the alleged
elimination of one physician failed to satisfy the Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc."" antitrust injury standard, ruling that
Shah's allegations of loss of patients and business were sufficient.99
In a companion case, Purnima Shah v. Memorial Hospital,100
the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
both antitrust and civil rights allegations. Purnima Shah, an anes-
95. 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,199 (W.D. Va. 1988).
96. Id. at 59,328.
97. Id. at 59,328-29.
98. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
99. 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 59,327.
100. 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,198 (W.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, per curiam, No. 88-2912
(4th Cir. May 22, 1989).
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thesiologist, asserted allegations similar to her husband's, and com-
plained that she was driven from Danville by delays in obtaining
her credentials and a conspiracy to deny her referrals.
The court dismissed the plaintiff's Sherman Act conspiracy
claims, ruling that the "plaintiff's claim of conspiracy is under-
mined by evidence in the record substantiating the reasonableness
of the [delay in granting staff privileges and restriction of staff
privileges].'' 101 The court stated:
This [c]ourt is not competent to judge the severity of Shah's
problems or to pass on her overall competency as an anesthesiolo-
gist. In light of this documentation that at least some problems ex-
isted, I cannot find the hospital's decision to restrict her privileges
was more likely motivated by a conspiracy than by concern for pa-
tient care. 10 2
Quoting White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., °3 for the pro-
position that "[c]onduct as consistent with permissible competition
as with illegal conspiracy does not itself support an inference of
antitrust conspiracy," Judge Kiser granted summary judgment as
to Shah's antitrust allegations and dismissed the action.
As in the Shah cases, Thompson v. Wise General Hospital,0 4
involved allegations of both civil rights and antitrust violations.
While the court in Mahendra Shah found that the gravamen of
the plaintiff's complaint was of a restraint of trade nature, the
court in Thompson found to the contrary, reasoning that:
Finally, there is considerable authority over the years for the pro-
position that the courts should not allow plaintiffs, by charging con-
spiracies in restraint of trade to turn every case into a Sherman Act
matter .... The basis of Dr. Thompson's action is and has always
been racial discrimination; the antitrust counts were sprung on the
court and the defendants out of a clear blue sky by the last of the
attorneys in his employ. The court has nonetheless given them care-
ful consideration, but notes that in the cases where courts have up-
held the bringing of antitrust complaints race has not been an is-
sue .... Since the real issue here is the allegation of racial animus,
which the Sherman Act was obviously not intended to address, the
101. Id. at 59,322.
102. Id. at 59,322-23.
103. 820 F.2d 98, 102 (4th Cir. 1987).
104. 707 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. Va. 1989).
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court finds the line of cases limiting the practical reach of the Sher-
man Act to be persuasive." °0
Most recently, Judge Michael, in Oksanen v. Page Memorial
Hospital,106 dismissed a physician's staff privileges case. In Ok-
sanen the plaintiff failed to present evidence satisfying the Mon-
santo conspiracy standard, despite factual findings by the court of
actions taken by the other members of the small medical staff of
the Luray, Virginia hospital to revoke Dr. Oksanen's privileges
amid public outcry regarding these efforts. Significantly, in Ok-
sanen, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that a hospital med-
ical staff may constitute a conspiracy in and of itself.107
Allegations of unlawful exclusive contracts in the medical arena
have fared no better. In Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. National Medi-
cal Enterprises, Inc.,108 plaintiff pathologists alleged violations of
the Sherman Act arising out of the termination of their contract to
provide pathology services at the Cherokee Memorial Hospital in
South Carolina. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the tying and conspiracy allegations, holding that no
antitrust injury resulted from plaintiffs' allegations and that the
plaintiffs' had failed to establish the existence of two separate
products or a conspiracy meeting the Monsanto standard. Follow-
ing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,09 and Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States,"0 the district court held that the plain-
tiffs did not demonstrate any injury to competition by substituting
one exclusive contractor for another. The plaintiffs contended that
competition had been injured by the fact that prices for pathology
services were higher than those that were charged by the plaintiffs
when they were contract pathologists at Cherokee Memorial Hos-
pital. The court rejected this contention, noting that "[e]ven as-
suming that this assertion were true, it would not establish injury
to competition because the relevant inquiry is not whether prices
have increased, but whether they have increased over the competi-
tive level. Plaintiffs, however, failed to offer any evidence regarding
competitive pricing levels.""'
105. Id. at 855-56 (citation omitted).
106. No. 88-0166-H (W.D. Va. June 16, 1989).
107. This contention was based on the Third Circuit's opinion in Weiss v. York Hosp.,
745 F.2d 786, 814 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).
108. 672 F. Supp. 1489 (D.S.C. 1987), aff'd., 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
109. 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
110. 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
111. Steuer & Latham, 672 F. Supp. at 1502.
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The court addressed plaintiffs' exclusive dealing claims by focus-
ing on whether the arrangement foreclosed competition among
producers or suppliers in a substantial share of the affected mar-
ket. Citing plaintiffs' problems with its definition of the product
and geographic markets, the court noted that foreclosure of an op-
portunity at a single hospital cannot constitute a violation of the
antitrust laws." 2
Similar claims were dismissed arising out of a hospital's relation-
ship with durable medical equipment suppliers. In three related
cases, Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Twin County Com-
munity Hospital; Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Radford
Community Hospital; and Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v.
Giles Memorial Hospital,"3 plaintiff's alleged that each of the
three hospitals entered into an exclusive contract with another de-
fendant to provide respiratory care, discharge services and durable
medical equipment for the hospitals. Plaintiff contended that the
hospitals' referrals to the defendant distributors foreclosed durable
medical equipment competition in violation of Sherman Act sec-
tions I and 2 and Clayton Act section 3. The court dismissed the
Sherman Act allegations," 4 finding that the plaintiff failed to bring
forth any evidence of predatory conduct on the part of the defend-
ants. In this regard, the court noted that the plaintiff allegations
that the defendant did not advertise plaintiff services but rather
promoted their own did not constitute a predatory act." 5
112. Id. at 1516.
113. Nos. 88-0344-R, 88-0345-R, 88-0346-R (W.D. Va. Dec. 29, 1988).
114. Judge Turk also rejected the plaintiff's Clayton Act section 3 claim for two reasons.
First, the court found section 3 inapplicable because plaintiff's narrow allegations demon-
strated that it alleged only that it had been excluded from supplying patients discharged
from defendant hospitals, and accordingly, did not compete with the defendant durable
medical equipment suppliers to supply equipment to hospitals or distributors. Second, as to
the sales of durable medical equipment to patients being discharged from the three hospi-
tals, the court noted that:
[pilaintiff does not allege, however, that transactions between the distributors and
patients involve agreements by any patients, either express or tacit, not to buy or
lease equipment from plaintiff or other competitors of the distributors. The transac-
tions between the new distributing companies and patients who are being discharged
from the three hospitals, as plaintiff allege them, therefore, do not run afoul of Clay-
ton Act § 3.
Advanced Health-Care Serv., Nos. 88-0344-R, 88-0345-R, 88-0346-R, slip op. at 31.
115. Id. at 35; see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Smith Kline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d
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In the Twin County and Giles cases, the plaintiff sought leave to
amend her complaint to assert predatory conduct as well as a vio-
lation of the essential facilities doctrine. Judge Turk denied the
amendment, ruling that it would be futile to permit an amendment
which fails to state a claim." 6 Following United States v. Grif-
fith,117 Smith Kline Corp. v. Eli Lilly"' and Aspen Highlands Ski-
ing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co.," 9 Judge Turk again ruled that
plaintiff's allegations of predatory acts did not rise to the requisite
level.120
3. Exclusive Contracts
In addition to the health care cases discussed above, in Stephen
Jay Photograph, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc.,' 2' the district court re-
jected the plaintiff's contention that the designation by Tidewater,
Virginia, high schools of Olan Mills as official school photographer
was an exclusive contract violative of the Sherman and Robinson-
Patman Acts. 22 The court rejected plaintiff's Sherman Act claims,
reasoning that no unlawful conspiracy could be implied simply be-
cause the alleged conspirators had entered into a contract. The
court noted that:
[T]he unlawful and unilateral conduct of one alleged conspirator
cannot be imputed to the other alleged conspirator merely because
the parties have entered into an otherwise lawful contractual ar-
rangement. The defendants' action in signing the various contracts
to become official school photographers are not evidence of a con-
scious commitment to deprive plaintiffs access to the relevant mar-
ket, absent direct or circumstantial evidence of the collateral agree-
ment, tacit or express, to engage in unlawful conduct.12 1
1056 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978).
116. Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Twin County Community Hosp., No. 88-0344-R
and Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Twin County Community Hosp., No. 88-0346-R
(W.D. Va. Mar. 21, 1989); see, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Island Creek
Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 832 F.2d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 1987); Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 911 (1980).
117. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
118. 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1978).
119. 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), af['d on other grounds, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
120. Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Twin County Community Hosp., No. 88-0344-R
and Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Twin County Community Hosp., No. 88-0346-R
(W.D. Va. Mar. 21, 1989).
121. 713 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Va. 1989).
122. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
123. 713 F. Supp. at 947.
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Once again, the court held that plaintiff's evidence did not tend to
exclude the possibility that the defendants acted independently.
124
E. Sherman Act Section 2 Monopolization Issues12 5
Consistent treatment of Sherman Act claims has been the hall-
mark of recent Virginia federal court opinions, with section 1 con-
spiracy claims and section 2 monopolization claims standing or
falling together. 2 ' In dismissing section 2 claims, the courts have
routinely cited plaintiff's failure to establish the requisite willful
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power.
For example, in Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. National Medical En-
terprises, Inc., 1  the court rejected plaintiff's monopolization
claim because the plaintiff failed to prove that pathology services
constituted an appropriate product market. The court next re-
jected the plaintiff's allegation of monopolization of the medical-
surgical services market because the defendant hospital was
neither a provider nor a consumer of these services.2 s The court
similarly dismissed the plaintiff's attempted monopolization
claims, ruling that the defendants had "neither the incentive nor
the ability to injure competitor in any relevant market,"12 9 thus
lacking the specific intent to monopolize.
Similarly, in Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hospital,30 the court
124. Id. at 947-48. The court based its dismissal of the Sherman Act section 2 allegations
of a shared monopoly between two defendant photography firms on its section 1 ruling,
quoting White v. Rockingham Radiologists, 820 F.2d 98, 104 (4th Cir. 1987), for the proposi-
tion that "one who does not compete in a product market or conspire with a competitor
cannot be held liable as a monopolist in the market." Id. at 948. (emphasis added).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monop-
olize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony. ... Id.
126. For example, the court in Advanced Health-Care dismissed the sections 1 and 2
Sherman Act claims for failure to adduce evidence of any unlawful predatory act. See supra
notes 113-16 and accompanying text. The courts in Purnima Shah, Stephen Jay Photogra-
phy, and Oksanen also dismissed conspiracy to monopolize claims once plaintiff's section 1
claims failed. The court in Purnima Shah implicitly recognized that as the defendant hospi-
tal did not provide anesthesiology services, plaintiff's only viable Sherman Act section 2
claim regarding this product market was her conspiracy to monopolize theory. 1988-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 68,198, at 59,322 (W.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, No. 88-2912 (4th Cir. 1989).
127. 672 F. Supp. 1489 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
128. Id. at 1521 (quoting White v. Rockingham Radiologists, 820 F.2d 98, 104-05 (4th Cir.
1987)).
129. Id. at 1520.
130. No. 88-0166-H (W.D. Va. 1989).
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rejected the Sherman Act section 2 claims because proof of the
willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power was
absent.13'
The defendants have submitted strong evidence that the various ac-
tions taken against Dr. Oksanen do not suggest the willful mainte-
nance of monopoly power, but were motivated by professional con-
cerns over the impact of Dr. Oksanen's behavior on hospital morale
and, ultimately, on patient care. In response, the plaintiff has rested
on his pleadings, setting forth no specific facts upon which a reason-
able jury could rely in order to find that the defendants willfully
acquired and maintained their assumed monopoly power.132
Consistently, the district court in Mahendra Shah v. Memorial
Hospital,' 3 overruled defendants' motions for summary judgment
as to both Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 claims. In Mahendra
Shah, the defendants contended that regardless of the section 1
allegations, a nonurologist could not be found to violate section 2
in a market defined by the plaintiff to consist of "urologic ser-
vices." The court disagreed, finding that "one need not be a direct
competitor to be liable for attempted monopoly under Section 2"
because the requisite monopoly power may be acquired either by
virtue of the defendant's business or by means of a conspiracy.3 1
Accordingly, as the plaintiff's antitrust conspiracy claim survived
summary judgment, the attempted monopolization and conspiracy
to monopolize claims were also allowed to continue.
In Environmental Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Co., 3 5 defendant
Sutron filed an attempted monopolization counterclaim to a patent
infringement lawsuit. The Eastern District of Virginia held that to
establish an antitrust violation, Sutron must prove the existence of
a specific attempt to monopolize and a dangerous probability that
the attempt would be successful in achieving a monopoly.'36 Not-
ing that Sutron failed to establish that Environmental Instruments
131. "The offense of monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1)
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
132. Id. at 27-28 (citations omitted).
133. 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,199 (W.D. Va. 1988).
134. Id. at 59,329.
135. 688 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Va. 1988).
136. Id. at 217-18.
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engaged in inequitable conduct in obtaining the patent, the court
summarily dismissed the claimed antitrust violation. 3 '
Finally, two Virginia federal district courts dismissed essential
facilities doctrine3 8 arguments because such doctrine can only be
asserted by a competitor of the alleged monopolist.1 9 Additionally,
in Reynolds Metals, Judge Merhige declined to consider whether a
monopoly leveraging claim 40 states an independent claim, finding
the plaintiffs' proof of the willful acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power sufficient to state "traditional [Section] 2
claims. '14
1
F. Mergers and Acquisitions
In one of the first antitrust challenges by the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice to the affiliation of two nonprofit hos-
pitals, 42 the Antitrust Division contended that the proposed affili-
ation of Carilion Health System (which operates Roanoke Memo-
rial Hospital ("RMH")) with Community Hospital of Roanoke
Valley ("CHRV") violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act.143 The court's denial of the Division's
137. Id. at 218.
138. "The 'essential facilities' doctrine imposes on the owner of a facility that cannot
reasonably be duplicated and which is essential to competition in a given market a duty to
make that facility available to its competitors on a nondiscriminatory basis." Ferguson v.
Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce Inc., 848 F.2d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 1988); see also
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539-41 (7th Cir. 1986); Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1519-21 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds,
472 U.S. 585 (1985); MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
139. Advanced Health-Care, Nos. 88-0344-R, 88-0346-R (W.D. Va. Mar. 21, 1988); Reyn-
olds Metals Co. v. Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., No. 87-0446-R (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 1988) (citing
Ferguson, 848 F.2d at 982-84; MCI v. AT&T, 708 at 1132-33, 1147 n.100).
140. Reynolds Metals, No. 87-0446-R, slip op. at 5. The court defined "monopoly leverag-
ing" as follows:
Monopoly leveraging, the use of monopoly power in one market to gain an unwar-
ranted competitive advantage in another, has been recognized in the Second and
Ninth Circuits. E.g., M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1982);
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980). On the other hand, this theory has been criticized by the D.C.
Circuit, A.I.A.W. v. N.C.A.A., 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and various legal
scholars.
Id.
141. Id. at 6.
142. United States v. Carilion Health System, 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989).
143. Id. at 841.
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effort to block the affiliation is notable in a number of respects.
Judge Turk dismissed the Clayton Act section 7 claim before
trial, reasoning that it applied only to stock transactions and asset
acquisitions subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC. As the pro-
posed affiliation involved nonstock, nonprofit institutions, the
court found section 7 of the Clayton Act inapplicable.'
The Sherman Act Section 1 case, tried before an advisory jury
instructed on the Rule of Reason, largely focused on market defini-
tion, efficiencies and economies, quality of care issues and the
likely competitive affect of the proposed affiliation. 14r The court
rejected the Antitrust Division's contention that an unreasonable
restraint of trade would result from the affiliation as being incon-
sistent with the evidence and further ruled, based on expert testi-
mony, that the alleged increase in concentration would not neces-
sarily translate into a price increase. 146 Central to the court's ruling
on anticompetitive effect was its finding that "as a general rule
hospital rates are lower, the fewer the number of hospitals in an
area. In addition, charitable, nonprofit hospitals tend to charge
lower rates than for-profit hospitals. Relative to other products
and services consumers buy, hospital services are not price sensi-
tive in a relevant market.' 1 47 The court found the proposed affilia-
tion did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade violative
of section 1 because of (a) evidence of strong existing competition
from Lewis-Gale Hospital (an HCA affiliate); (b) the procompeti-
tive motivation for the affiliation; (c) the affiliating entities' com-
plimentary nature; (d) the restraint on price increases imposed by
the Virginia Health Services Cost Review Council and the boards
of directors of the affiliating nonprofit institutions; (e) economic
144. Id. at 841 n.1. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce . . ., in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
As the affiliating entities were nonstock corporations, the proposed affiliation did not in-
volve an acquisition of stock or share capital. Moreover, as both entities were nonprofit, they
also were not subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC. Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 891 n.1.
145. Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 842.
146. Id. at 849.
147. Id. at 846.
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efficiencies and capital avoidance savings; and (f) the likely en-
hanced quality of care.
A hearing on the Antitrust Division's appeal was conducted on
October 3, 1989 before the Fourth Circuit and the parties are pres-
ently awaiting the court's opinion.
G. Price Discrimination
Recent Virginia case law involving the Robinson-Patman Act is
indicative of the judicial disfavor in which such suits are held.
In Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc.,4 s the
Eastern District rejected the plaintiff's assertion that commission
payments to schools by competing photographers constituted com-
mercial bribery violative of section 13(c) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 1 9 The district court noted that the Virginia Attorney General
has twice addressed this issue and disagreed with the Attorney
General's 1976 opinion that any payment made to a school to influ-
ence its choice of supplier violates Section 13(c). 5 0 While the dis-
trict court agreed with the Attorney General's finding that the
schools act as intermediaries for students and parents, it did not
consider the contracts to constitute commercial bribery because
such arrangements were not secret.' 5 ' The court also rejected Jay's
argument that the school district did not provide services to the
defendant photographers commensurate with the commissions
paid, reasoning that as long as the services provided to the school
were more than de minimis, it would not retrospectively weigh the
consideration in the contract bargained for by the parties.'52
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Clark Oil Co. v.
148. 713 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Va. 1989).
149. Id. at 943. Section 13(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act states that:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission,
brokerage, or other compensation or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except
for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or mer-
chandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative,
or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in be-
half, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction
other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
150. Stephen Jay Photography, 713 F. Supp. at 940-41.
151. Id. at 941.
152. Id. at 942-43.
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Texaco, Inc.,15 3 affirmed the Maryland district court's dismissal of
a Robinson-Patman claim filed by a Texaco oil distributor. Plain-
tiff alleged price discrimination based on hauling allowances
granted other distributors by Texaco and claimed the denial of this
allowance to Clark Oil caused it not to be competitive for retail
service station business. The Fourth Circuit recognized that plain-
tiff Clark Oil differed in its relationship with Texaco and the other
Texaco distributors whom Clark Oil claimed received favorable
prices.14 While Clark Oil was a seller to end users of Texaco's
products, the alleged favored distributors sold primarily to gasoline
stations rather than end users. Moreover, in return for the hauling
allowances, Texaco imposed other requirements, e.g., storage credit
and sales quotas on the distributors other than Clark Oil. Perhaps
of greater significance, however, was the fact that many of these
other distributors paid a delivery price even though they hauled
the oil from Texaco's terminal themselves, justifying the hauling
allowance. Unlike these customers, Clark Oil paid a terminal
price.'55
Finally, in four related suits for payment on open account for
goods sold and delivered, the circuit courts in Roanoke and
Botetourt Counties, following the opinions of the Supreme Court's
in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 6 and the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Sargoy, 57
denied defendants' affirmative defense based on the Virginia price
discrimination statute. 58
III. VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
The Antitrust and Consumer Litigation Section of the Attorney
General's office has announced settlements of civil enforcements
actions in the soft drink, consumer electronics and mobile home
industries over the last year.
153. No. 86-1244 (4th Cir. 1988).
154. Id. at 4.
155. Id. at 2-3.
156. 330 U.S. 743 (1947).
157. 215 Va. 714, 214 S.E.2d 131, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 940 (1975).
158. GCC Beverages, Inc. v. Granco, Inc., No. CL85000627 (Roanoke 1988); GCC Bever-
ages, Inc. v. Blantom Corp., No. CL85000626 (Roanoke 1988); GCC Beverages, Inc. v. BRB
Corp, No. 85000025 (Botetourt County 1988); GCC Beverages, Inc. v. Bland A. Painter, Jr.,
No. 85000024 (Botetourt County 1988).
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A. Soft Drink Settlements
In 1988, the Attorney General filed civil antitrust suits against
Allegheny Bottling Co., the Mid-Atlantic Bottling Co., Inc., Gen-
eral Cinema Beverages of Virginia, Inc., General Cinema Beverages
of Washington, D.C., Inc., and Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Ro-
anoke, Inc., alleging conspiracies to fix soft drink prices in Rich-
mond, Norfolk, Roanoke and the Washington D.C. metropolitan
areas. Each suit was subsequently settled, requiring defendants to
pay amounts ranging from $10,000 to $30,000 to a settlement ac-
count to be held in escrow for the benefit of all governmental enti-
ties which purchased soft drinks. The settlement agreements pro-
vide each relevant political subdivision in the area of the
conspiracy the opportunity to obtain a pro rata share of the settle-
ment proceeds based on its population.
B. Consumer Electronics Settlement
In March 1989, the Attorney General filed suit in federal court
in New York alleging a nationwide conspiracy to fix the retail price
of Panasonic and Technics consumer electronics merchandise. The
complaint alleged that Panasonic announced a new corporate pol-
icy to raise profits in the retail sale of its consumer electronic prod-
ucts and repeatedly attempted to coerce retailers to adhere to the
retail prices fixed by Panasonic. The settlement agreement con-
templates Panasonic's compliance with the antitrust laws; required
Panasonic to reaffirm to each retailer, dealer and distributor of its
products the right to independently set its prices; and requires
Panasonic to establish a settlement account to refund consumer
purchasers of certain Panasonic products.
C. Mobile Home Consent Decrees
In May 1988, two consent decrees were entered in the Circuit
Court of Fairfax County arising out of allegations of the unlawful
tying of mobile home lot leases to sales of new or used mobile
homes.'5 9 The terms of the Faigen consent decrees required de-
fendants to pay $50,000, enjoined them from tying leases of mobile
home lots to mobile home sales, required them to undertake steps
to formally comply with the terms of the consent decree and
159. Commonwealth v. Faigen, No. 106612, (Fairfax May 5, 1988); Commonwealth v.
Epps, No. 106898, (Fairfax May 26, 1988).
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granted inspection rights to the Attorney General for ten years.
The Epps consent decree similarly enjoined defendants from un-
lawfully tying mobile home lot leases and sales, secured defendants
cooperation in additional investigation and litigation, required de-
fendants to formally comply with the decree and permitted Attor-
ney General inspections for ten years.
IV. STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES
A. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Under Virginia Anti-
trust Act
In three opinions handed down by the Circuit Court of Prince
William County in 1986 and 1987, the court held that defendants
engaged in a per se violation of the Virginia Antitrust Act'60 by
tying mobile home leases to sales of mobile homes.' 6 ' Nevertheless,
as the Attorney General only sought injunctive relief pursuant to
section 59.1-9.15(a) of the Code of Virginia, 1 2 the court denied the
plaintiff's petition for recovery of attorneys' fees and costs. 6 3
As a result, section 59.1-9.15(a) of the Code of Virginia was
amended by the General Assembly in 1988 to add the following
language: "In any such action or proceeding in which the plaintiff
substantially prevails, the court may award the cost of suit, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee, to such plaintiff.' 6
B. Extension of Joint Subcommittee to Study Insurance Anti-
trust Exemption
The 1989 General Assembly approved House Joint Resolution
382 which continued the activities of the joint subcommittee stud-
ying (1) the reinsurance practices of insurance companies; (2) the
exemption from the antitrust laws granted to the insurance indus-
try, and (3) the availability and affordability of liability insurance.
160. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989). "Every
contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade of commerce of this Common-
wealth is unlawful." Id. at § 59.1-9.5.
161. Commonwealth v. Winslow, 8 Va. Cir. 198 (1986 & 1987); Commonwealth v. Wins-
low, 9 Va. Cir. 130 (1987).
162. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.15(a) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
163. Section 59.1-9.15(a) of the Code of Virginia, empowers the Attorney General to seek
injunctive relief on behalf of the Commonwealth for violations of the Virginia Antitrust Act.
It is silent as to recovery of attorney's fees and costs. Id. However, suits to "recover the
actual damages sustained, reasonable attorney's fees and the costs of suit" are allowed. Id. §
59.1-9.15(a),(b) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
164. Id. § 59.1-9.15(a) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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C. Miscellaneous Trade Legislation
In other legislative actions of interest, the 1989 General Assem-
bly ariended the Mobile Home Lot Rental Act' 65 to prohibit the
demand of certain fees by landlords; 66 recodified the Wine
Franchise Act; 67 amended the Beer Franchise Act 8 to delete an
exception for unilateral amendment of a wholesaler's contract by a
brewery and to provide that contracts between breweries and beer
wholesalers are governed by the laws of Virginia; 69 added new pro-
visions regarding illegal copying of recordings; 70 amended the Vir-
ginia Membership Camping Act 171 to limit the number of member-
ship camping contracts a registered operator may sell; 72 added the
Prizes and Gift Act requiring disclosures on offerings of prizes or
gifts; 173 restructural sections relating to the regulation of ceme-
teries, and pre-need funeral and burial contracts; 74 added the
Credit Services Business Act, 75 and added the Virginia Public
Telephone Information Act relating to provision of information as




In United States v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 77 the court imposed
a novel sentence and terms of probation upon Allegheny Bottling
Company ("Allegheny Pepsi") as a result of its conviction of price
165. Id. §§ 55-248.41 to -248.51 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
166. Id. § 55-248.45 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
167. -Id. §§ 4-118.42 to -118.61.
168. Id. §§ 4-118.3 to -118.20:1 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
169. Id. §§ 4-118.7, -118.16 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
170. Id. §§ 59.1-41.1 to -41.4, -41.6.
171. Id. §§ 59.1-313 to -335 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
172. Id. §§ 59.1-313, -317, -325 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
173. Id. §8 59.1-415 to -423.
174. Id. 88 54.1-2800, 57-35.11 (Cum. Supp. 1989); see also Guardian Plans, Inc. v.
Teague, No. 88-3101 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the licensure
requirements and telephone solicitation restrictions of Virginia's funeral laws).
175. Id. §8 59.1 -335.1 to -335.12.
176. Id. §8 59.1-424 to -428.
177. 695 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Va. 1988).
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fixing under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Allegheny Pepsi, along
with several of its officers, had been convicted of conducting a
price fixing conspiracy with Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Com-
pany ("Mid-Atlantic Coke"). The conspiracy involved an agree-
ment to adhere to the prices established in promotional letters
published by Mid-Atlantic Coke and Allegheny Pepsi.' Breaking
new ground, the court found that a corporation could be impris-
oned within the meaning of the Sherman Act and sentenced Alle-
gheny Pepsi to three years imprisonment and a $1,000,000 fine.
Suspending the prison term and $50,000 of the fine, the court
placed Allegheny Pepsi on probation for three years. As a condi-
tion of probation, Allegheny Pepsi was required to provide employ-
ees of comparable salary to those convicted to perform full-time
community service for periods of either one or two years in the
geographic areas in which Allegheny's price fixing activities oc-
curred. As a further condition of probation, the court imposed
upon the company restrictions on the disposition of its assets. 179
The district court's opinion was short-lived, however, in an un-
published per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed that portion of Allegheny Pepsi's sentence which
provided for imprisonment, probation and special conditions of
probation. 80 Citing Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States,'8' the
Fourth Circuit noted that:
[T]he Supreme Court clearly held that a corporation may not be
sent to jail. The language of 15 U.S.C. § 1 is abundantly clear that
$1,000,000 is the maximum a corporation may be fined for violating
this section, and there are no additional or alternate sanctions which
would even suggest imprisonment or probation of a corporation."8 "
B. Convictions
In United States v. Gravely,8 3 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit upheld defendant's conviction on charges arising
out of a conspiracy to fix soft drink prices. The court ruled, inter
178. Id. at 857.
179. Id. at 858-59.
180. See United States v. Allegheny Bottling Co., No. 88-5146 (4th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam).
181. 359 U.S. 271 (1959).
182. Allegheny Bottling Co., No. 88-5146, slip op. at 10.
183. 840 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1988).
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alia, that the evidence was sufficient in fact and law to support the
verdict as to the section 1 Sherman Act conviction. Gravely argued
that market study evidence negated a conclusion that the market
was the subject of price fixing. The court found the market study
argument to be specious for three reasons: (1) horizontal price fix-
ing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act and thus the prosecu-
tion need not prove an adverse affect on competition; (2) a Sher-
man Act violation is established even if a conspiracy is
unsuccessful; and (3) proof of the conspiracy was provided by the
efforts of the conspirators to enforce their agreement, by policing
and subsequent meetings. 184
The court also rejected Gravely's argument that the interstate
commerce requirement was not met. The court noted that the jury
was instructed on both alternative tests for interstate commerce:
the "in the flow of commerce" test and the "effect on commerce
test.'1 85 Noting that the soft drink bottlers involved in the conspir-
acy maintained offices in a number of states, that Pepsi-Cola is
made from ingredients from all over the world and that it is bot-
tled in Maryland and shipped to Virginia, the court held that there
was ample evidence for a jury to find that a conspiracy in canned
soft drinks in Virginia had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
86
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also held in Gravely
that the lower court properly charged the jury concerning the rela-
tionship of the Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman Act.
Gravely argued that an exchange of price lists between competitors
was not an illegal price fixing conspiracy but rather an attempt to
perfect the Robinson-Patman Act's "meeting competition" de-
fense.18 Recognizing that the Supreme Court in United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 88 had rejected the assertion that the
Robinson-Patman Act insulates price list exchanges from Sherman
Act scrutiny, the court held the charge that "the Robinson-Patman
Act is not a defense to price fixing" properly stated the law.' 89
Also of some interest to practitioners in the field of criminal an-
184. Id. at 1161.
185. Id. at 1161-62 (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 242
(1980)).
186. Gravely, 840 F.2d at 1162.
187. Id.
188. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
189. Gravely, 840 F.2d at 1162.
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titrust law is the Fourth Circuit's opinion in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena.190 There the court held that third party deponents in a
civil action could not have a grand jury subpoena quashed on the
grounds that the deposition testimony sought was sealed by a pro-
tective order issued by a district court sitting in another jurisdic-
tion. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Maryland district court's
holding that a civil protective order could not be used to shield
discovery materials from a subpoena issued by a grand jury.191 The
court adopted a strict rule holding that grand jury subpoenas took
precedence on all occasions over documents under Rule 26(c)192
protective orders. The court rejected a case-by-case approach find-
ing that the grand jury's need to gather evidence was an overriding
interest and that only assertion of the right against self-incrimina-
tion can insure a witness that his fifth amendment rights will be
protected. 93
C. Price Fixing Indictments, Information and Convictions
The government was especially active in 1988 and 1989 in its
criminal investigation of price fixing in the soft drink industry.
9 4
In addition to the convictions noted earlier, several cases have re-
sulted in pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.
V. CONCLUSION
While frequently asserted in civil actions, antitrust claims are
difficult to prosecute and prove. Successful plaintiffs must clear
threshold statutory and judicial hurdles involving issues of suffi-
ciency of pleadings, antitrust immunity, jurisdiction, market defi-
nition, antitrust injury and standing before consideration of their
claims on the merits. For these reasons and others, civil antitrust
plaintiffs have not fared well in recent years in Virginia. On the
other hand, state civil enforcement involving tying arrangements
190. 836 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir. 1988).
191. Id. at 1478.
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
193. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d at 1477.
194. United States v. Rissmiller, No. 87-00061 (W.D. Va. 1987); United States v. Seven-
Up, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., No. 88-12 (W.D. Va. 1988); United States v. Thurman, No. 88-
13 (W.D. Va. 1988); United States v. Lively, No. 88-00016 (W.D. Va. 1988); United States v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Roanoke, Inc., No. 88-39 (W.D. Va. 1988); United States v. Beach,
No. 88-51 (W.D. Va. 1988); United States v. All-American Bottling Corp. No. 88-38 (W.D.
Va. 1988).
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and price fixing conspiracies, and federal criminal enforcement,
largely limited to price fixing conspiracies, have successfully re-
sulted in consent decrees, guilty and nolo contendere pleas
throughout Virginia.
